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Editor's Introduction
Struggle and Legitimation
Stephen Ellmann
A specter is haunting lawyers working against injustice-the specter of
legitimation.' Those who seek to challenge unjust states by using the law of
those states against them are very likely to feel tarnished by the need to
speak in terms of laws they despise. This sense of personal taint is bad
enough, and sometimes may simply be intolerable. But perhaps it is even
worse to wonder whether one's desperate efforts to maneuver within an un-
just system in the end add luster to that system and so help preserve the evil
one opposes. And this fear of "involuntary legitimation" is an easy one for
which to find some foundation. After all, many nations-some more just
than others-pride themselves on their adherence to the rule of law. Their
leaders evidently believe, or at any rate hope, that fidelity to law is legiti-
mizing. If they are right in their understanding of the sources of their own
power, then it is only a short step to the conclusion that when law is being
used to legitimate great injustice, no opponent of that injustice should lend
credibility to law.
This is an important worry, and one that deserves careful exploration.
It deserves such exploration in part because serious strategic judgments may
turn on it. When legal strategies do reinforce unjust power, pursuing these
strategies may be unwise and wrong. Moreover, this examination may reveal
that some legal strategies are more compromising than others and that dis-
covery may guide lawyers as they choose which cases to handle, and where.
The truth is, however, that while resolving this question might affect
some strategic assessments, lawyers are already making such assessments
daily, and in scores of countries around the world they have chosen to pur-
sue many of the legal avenues available to them for resisting state injustice.
Stephen Ellmann is a professor of law at New York Law School. He thanks the editors of
Law and Social Inquiry, especially Elizabeth Mertz, for their suggestions and patience as this
Symposium developed.
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Clients are making the same decisions-or, as George Bisharat suggests,
they are simply ignoring the abstractions of legitimation in favor of the con-
crete hope, however slim, of legal relief. Perhaps these lawyers and clients
are misguided, but it is more likely, I think, that we as scholars have much
to learn from the "on-the-ground" judgments of practice. Thus the impor-
tance of this exploration lies not only in its potential impact on practical
decisions but also-perhaps more-in its potential impact on an accurate
scholarly understanding .of the nature of lawyers' work and law's role in
society.
Studying the issue of legitimation may also help us to understand better
what might be called the "discourse" of legitimation. Why, we might ask,
does the question of legitimation occupy our attention? Surely the answer is
not only that this question is, "objectively," a good question. For practicing
lawyers, part of the force of this question may be that it gives form to the
sense of futility and of taint that comes from working extremely hard in
unfriendly forums to win minimal victories. For outside observers, part of
this question's appeal may be that it embodies the skepticism that many
have come to feel about the value of lawyers and of law in general, and the
related sense of the pervasiveness and ingeniousness of power in resisting
challenge. There is much for practicing lawyers to be frustrated by and
much for observers to be skeptical about. But if the danger of legitimation
proves to be less severe than it sometimes seems-if we find that in condi-
tions of great injustice lawyers' resistance can and sometimes does make a
difference-then we have reason to temper both frustration and skepticism.
The purpose of this Symposium is to take the danger of legitimation
seriously. In doing so, we build on the work of other scholars, many of
whose thoughts are discussed in these articles. The reason for revisiting this
question is not to exorcise the ghost of legitimation, for these studies do not
acquit lawyering against injustice of the charge that it has some legitimating
effects. But the conjunction of these four studies, we hope, allows readers to
assess the issue of legitimation in a particularly wide-ranging fashion. The
four articles approach the issue in a diverse array of nations and legal sys-
tems and from a number of different perspectives; they have no single
message and this Introduction can only touch on, rather than summarize, all
their insights.2 What the Introduction seeks to do, however, is to place the
articles in relation to each other and to suggest some of the lessons, and the
questions, that they highlight.
2. The articles are George E. Bisharat, "Courting Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering
under Israeli Occupation"; Stephen Ellmann, "Law and Legitimacy in South Africa"; Mark J.
Osiel, "Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil"; Jane Kaufman
Winn & Tang-chi Yeh, "Advocating Democracy: The Role of Lawyers in Taiwan's Political
Transformation." The bulk of this Introduction consists of a discussion of these articles; I cite
particular pages from them only for direct quotations.
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The articles do collectively demonstrate' that the task of identifying
and assessing legitimation effects is complex and delicate. They also give
reason to believe that the legitimation that lawyering may confer on unjust
states is less inevitable and often less substantial than might have been
feared. Moreover, the articles remind us that not every legitimation effect is
necessarily to be regretted. An appeal phrased in the terms favored by the
powerful may save more lives than a more outspoken critique, as Mark Osiel
emphasizes. To the extent that lawyering against injustice legitimizes the
idea that in a just society the rule of law might be an important bulwark
against oppression, as George Bisharat and I suggest, again the legitimating
impact of this work may well be a benefit rather than a cost. Finally, the
Symposium suggests that a comprehensive appraisal of lawyers' work in un-
just states-an appraisal weighing the full range of tangible impacts and
symbolic legitimation effects that may result from lawyers' efforts-will
often find that on balance lawyers' contribution to the struggle against in-
justice is of real value.
WIhat can lawyers accomplish? The first step in any such appraisal is to
understand what it is that lawyers can actually do in unjust states. Why are
they allowed to operate? Can they make arguments of any substance within
the terms of an unjust legal system? Can they ever win? We would not need
to discuss legitimation if there were nothing lawyers could do anyway-but
there is. Not in every country, to be sure. Indeed, Jane Kaufman Winn and
Tang-chi Yeh's contribution illuminates how much the legal system in Tai-
wan had to change before it could be seen as at all hospitable to the idea of
reformist lawyering. The state's restriction of the number of lawyers, its
close control of the process of admission to the bar, its scrutiny of candi-
dates for the magistracy and for prosecutorial positions, and its control over
the bar associations-to say nothing of the host of other elements of au-
thoritarian rule-all restricted the growth of lawyering against injustice.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that even before the end of martial law in
1987, some lawyers evidently were engaged in such work, on behalf of con-
sumers, women, and political defendants.
The truth is that it is not easy for a state to operate a legal system while
altogether barring the use of that system by those who oppose the state's
unjust acts. States that set some store by their reputation for adherence to
law-and many do, among them Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa,
and Taiwan, the countries examined here3-cannot easily close their courts
3. That most of these countries were guilty of profound injustice during the periods these
articles examine will not seem controversial. To call Israel's occupation of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip unjust, however, certainly is controversial. I note, as Bisharat does (p. 354),
that it is not necessary to believe that Israel's occupation is unjustifiable to believe "that the
.. Israeli military governments' repressive powers have been great, and their exercise fre-
quent," and so to include a study of law in Israel's Occupied Territories in this Symposium on
lawyering in repressive states.
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or jail their lawyers. Nor can they painlessly spell out in "law" each of the
injustices they propose to commit. Nor is it at all simple, as the many schol-
ars who have argued the plasticity of legal doctrine have shown, to shape
legal provisions that absolutely foreclose argument on behalf of the state's
victims. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult for any one state to
write rights out of its law, as human rights consciousness and insistence on
the human rights promises of international law grow more deeply embedded
in international politics.
Mark Osiel focuses on the utility of various theories of jurisprudence
for expressing opposition to injustice. Osiel's concern here is with judges,
but his insights bear on the rhetorical resources available to lawyers as well.
Revisiting the famous debate between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller over
the impact of positivism and natural law thinking in Nazi Germany, and
incorporating attention to the effects of legal realism as well, Osiel con-
cludes that none of these theories intrinsically disposes its practitioners
either to accept or to repudiate state conduct and that each of them can be
put to the service of resistance to injustice. As he shows in examining the
case of Argentina under the juntas, courts may find it possible to speak
quite a measure of truth to power even, or especially, when they deliberately
adopt the preferred legal framework of the regime they address. The Argen-
tinian Supreme Court chose to speak largely in the language of legal real-
ism-an imported American perspective which had been turned into a
rationale for the manipulation of law in the service of power-and Osiel
contends that what the Court said was to a significant degree heard (though
he feels the Court should have gone further than it did). Osiel also com-
ments that judicial formalism (which can be a species of positivism) "has
surely saved more lives and preserved more liberties than naturalism" (p.
546), since this framework allows courts to resist rulers' wishes by invoking
the mysteries of legal technicality. Moreover, Osiel finds in Brazil evidence
of the utility of natural law jurisprudence, which he sees the Brazilian
Supreme Court as having adopted in an effort to speak cogently not to
Brazil's dictators but to its people. Osiel does not contend, however, that
each of these approaches is equally available and useful in every unjust state;
instead, he urges us to pursue further the question of which theories in ac-
tual practice provide the best resources for resistance to injustice.
So long as lawyers are free to operate, and so long as they have legal
propositions available to invoke, it turns out that they can accomplish quite
a lot. Some of what they can accomplish they will achieve through litiga-
tion, but lawyers' work can take many forms, and a full assessment of law-
yers' impact requires us to avoid too narrow an understanding of what
lawyers actually do. Thus they may carve out discrete areas of law in which
progress can be made; Winn and Yeh, for example, mention Taiwanese law-
yers' efforts in the fields of labor relations, consumer law, and women's
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rights. They may preserve contact with the victims of state power, even if
doing so makes the lawyers feel more like social workers than lawyers (as
George Bisharat reports of lawyers in Israel's Occupied Territories). They
may win shorter periods of imprisonment for their clients or reduce the risk
of lethal torture, as Bisharat also reports. Similarly, Osiel suggests that the
Argentinian Supreme Court shaped legal responses to injustice that could
have protected some of the juntas' victims (though the court failed to carry
through on this promise). Lawyers may also pursue challenges to injustice
outside the courts. One method of doing so is to address the international
and domestic court of public opinion (as in the Palestinian case once more).
Another is to lobby, as in the context of West Bank and the Gaza Strip or
South Africa. Yet another is to campaign for office, as a considerable
number of antigovernment lawyers in Taiwan have chosen to. Or lawyers
may protest-for example, by announcing a fast in support of hunger strik-
ers, as some lawyers did in South Africa.
What leads lawyers to attempt this work? We also would not need to
discuss the impact of lawyers' work if lawyers did not choose to use their
professional skills and status in work against injustice. It is worth pausing for
a moment, therefore, to consider what we can say about lawyers' motiva-
tions for undertaking this work, work that even if sometimes fruitful will
often be frustrating and may be dangerous. Certainly much of what moti-
vates lawyers must not be law. Bisharat, for example, sees the primary moti-
vation of Palestinian lawyers as political-they, like other Palestinians in
all walks of life, oppose Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Moreover, politics may be of many stripes; Osiel believes that the
judges of the Argentine Supreme Court offered criticism of some of the
juntas' actions not because they believed the juntas were illegitimate but
because they supported the juntas and wanted them to live up to their aspi-
rations. For lawyers motivated primarily by politics, the decision to use legal
methods for political objectives could simply be an instrumental, tactical
choice, presumably based on the sort of analysis of what can be accom-
plished that this Introduction is describing.
But law may also play a motivating role. Osiel suggests that the princi-
pal way jurisprudential theories can encourage resistance to injustice is to
provide judges (and, again, the same would be true for lawyers) with argu-
ments that are relatively less offensive to the regime responsible for the
injustice. Less offensive arguments are safer arguments, and people will be
more likely to act if doing so seems less perilous.
It may be, in addition, that the impact of legal training and legal ideals
is sometimes more positive than this. Winn and Yeh have found that in
Taiwan people with legal backgrounds are more likely to enter politics in
opposition to the government than in association with it; perhaps legal
training led to opposition politics-although, as Winn and Yeh observe, it
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may instead have been opposition sentiments that led to legal training.
Winn and Yeh also describe the striking experiences of some Taiwanese
lawyers, who were themselves radicalized by their bitter experience as de-
fense counsel in a political trial early in the 1980s. If ideals matter to men
and women, and if lawyers tend to embrace the ideals law asserts, then we
are entitled to suggest that law inspires as well as facilitates lawyers' efforts
against injustice.
Can law that is linked to injustice enjoy any legitimacy? It is only because
lawyers do undertake this work, and because it has some impact, that there
is real reason to be concerned about its legitimating effects. Even where
lawyers can accomplish something, however, we would not need to examine
the danger of legitimation if it turned out that law simply enjoyed no legiti-
macy whatsoever. But it is clear that this is not the case. Rulers may need to
legitimize their conduct in their own eyes, and the sense of fidelity to law
may be very helpful in this enterprise, as George Bisharat suggests. They
also need to win and maintain the approval of those groups in the popula-
tion to whom they look for support. Law may well have helped legitimize
apartheid in the eyes of whites; occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip in the eyes of Israelis; and campaigns against the left in the eyes of
some portions of Brazilian and Argentinian society.
Moreover, law appears to have considerably more legitimacy among
oppressed people themselves than might have been imagined. Bisharat
notes the "nearly naive trust in the bona fides of Israeli legal institutions"
that Palestinian lawyers initially had, and also points to these lawyers' con-
tinued feeling (at least before the intifada) that the judges of the military
courts were good judges though they applied bad law (p. 382). Similarly,
Winn and Yeh report that Taiwanese with only primary school education
are much less likely than the most educated (and presumably most power-
ful) of their fellow citizens to believe that bribes or personal connections are
sometimes required to win a lawsuit.
My contribution to the Symposium focuses on this issue 4 and argues
that black South Africans did accord the legal system of apartheid a consid-
erable measure of legitimacy-much more than might have been expected
in light of the tremendous and pervasive rejection of apartheid itself. Oppo-
sition to apartheid, I contend, did not translate into absolute rejection of
every institution associated with it. Instead, I suggest, many Africans who
deeply abhorred apartheid were decidedly conservative on many other is-
sues, and might well have accorded some legitimacy to the country's legal
system because it provided them-poorly, but better than any other institu-
tion-with a measure of security against crime and also offered a measure of
4. I discuss the evidence from South Africa on many of the other questions outlined in
this introduction in Stephen Ellmann, In a Tme of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's
State of Emergency (1992).
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redress of injustice. It is even possible that some Africans, infected by
apartheid with a sense of their own racial inferiority, might have considered
the state legal system legitimate partly because it was run by whites. Other
Africans who proudly rejected apartheid and who were not conservative in
any sense may nonetheless have had a measure of faith in the courts, per-
haps because they felt so strongly the power of the stories they had to tell
and welcomed the opportunity to be heard that courts could provide. Still
others, more skeptical activists who were adamantly determined to bring
down apartheid and judged institutions and people by their contribution to
that goal, may have found some significance in the fact that these courts did
not relentlessly rule in favor of the state, and may have been struck by the
courage and commitment displayed by anti-apartheid lawyers-both those
who worked in courts and those, like Nelson Mandela, who led from else-
where. While I doubt that African activists would have endorsed the legiti-
macy of the legal system under apartheid, it is quite possible that they drew
from their experiences with that system a measure of legitimation for the
ideals of the rule of law.
Does the risk of legitimation outweigh the benefits of lawyering against injus-
tice? If law does enjoy some measure of legitimacy among rulers and ruled,
observers and observed, and if lawyers' work within the legal system is some-
times meaningful, then it becomes plausible to think that lawyers might in
fact contribute to the legitimacy of the legal system and through it to the
legitimacy of the state as a whole. Put differently, each lawyer must con-
front the moral question of whether it is "reasonably foreseeable" that law-
yering against injustice will "further... the policies" that the lawyer meant
to defeat.5 I argue in my article that in light of the ways that Africans appar-
ently appraised their legal system, the activities of anti-apartheid lawyers
likely did contribute to the measure of legitimacy Africans accorded to that
system. But the leap from legitimizing the legal system, however partially, to
legitimizing the system as a whole is a huge one. It deserves emphasis that
legal challenges to injustice, at least at first blush, by no means enhance a
regime's reputation. What such cases do, after all, is to assert the existence
of injustice. Often they do so in passionate language, reported in the press,
observed by human rights monitors, and backed up with evidence. The first
effect such cases should have should be to disgrace the state rather than to
buttress it.
Still we cannot ignore the possibility of a second, and ultimately
greater, effect: to enhance the legitimacy of an unjust system by bolstering
the illusion that it operates fairly and according to rules. At one level, to be
sure, this suggestion turns out to be quite implausible: people who consider a
government outrageously oppressive are not likely to change their minds
5. The quoted language is drawn from Mark Osiel's statement (p. 550) of the "criterion
of moral self-scrutiny" that public officials should adopt.
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because the courts remain open. South African blacks did not revise their
view of apartheid, nor have Palestinians revised their assessment of the Is-
raeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We have already
seen that the claim of adherence to law may be used as a basis for seeking
legitimacy with other audiences as well, however, and for these other audi-
ences the efforts of lawyers opposing injustice may offer more potent reas-
surance about the fundamental legitimacy of the system. Weighing such
potential costs against the possible benefits that lawyers might simultane-
ously win is difficult indeed. Doing so is the central concern of George
Bisharat's article and an important theme of the work of Jane Winn and
Tang-chi Yeh.
Bisharat studies the landscape of lawyering in the Occupied Territories
and concludes that although the victories of lawyers representing Palestini-
ans have been decidedly modest, and their work has had some legitimation
effects, nonetheless the benefits of their work have likely outweighed the
costs. He also emphasizes that even after close analysis it is difficult to be
certain of this very conclusion-and observes that one reason for endorsing
lawyers' efforts in the context of this uncertainty is that "there is ... logical
appeal in the aphorism 'a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush'" (pp.
398-99). I will not try to recapitulate here his detailed analysis of the vari-
ous factors weighing in this balance.
Instead, I want to highlight one aspect of his discussion-his argument
that even though Palestinians certainly never were induced to support the
occupation as a result of any legitimizing impact of lawyers' work, the inten-
sity of their opposition to it might have been weakened. Bisharat notes the
troubling possibility that "more repression is better than less, at least insofar as
mobilizing a political oppositional movement is concerned" (p. 352). He
also suggests that lawyers, precisely because they were able to help their
clients negotiate their encounters with the legal system somewhat less pain-
fully, may have encouraged clients to go along with the system rather than
challenge it-as they might have if they had unanimously refused to accept
plea bargains and so tied up the courts. Perhaps, in addition, the opportu-
nity to be heard in the courts offered Palestinians "symbolic compensation"
for what they had suffered and so contributed to making their fury less in-
tense (p. 389). Though Bisharat ultimately finds the benefits of lawyers'
work greater than its costs, these observations remind us, as he says, that
when a state cannot win legitimacy in the eyes of those it governs, it may
still be able to use law to encourage acquiescence.
Even after these complexities have been mastered, our analysis of the
costs and benefits of lawyering against injustice is not complete. Here as
elsewhere, we must go on to ask the question "compared to what?" If judges
disposed to protect human rights abandon the field of conventional adjudi-
cation to avoid lending legitimacy to injustice, then, as Mark Osiel corn-
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ments, "we deny ourselves-as advocates for its victims-the chance to
chasten executive abuse in these standard lawyerly ways" (p. 554). The Pal-
estinian case is a particularly illuminating one on this score, as Bisharat
demonstrates, because there it is possible to compare the results of lawyers'
work with the results of lawyers' not working-that is, with the results of
the prolonged strike initiated by Palestinian lawyers of the West Bank. As
Bisharat notes, Israeli courts would likely have successfully claimed a con-
siderable measure of legitimacy even in the absence of any participation by
lawyers opposed to the occupation; even more important, in actual practice
the strike disabled its participants from playing the various supportive roles
in challenging the injustices of the occupation that those actually in the
trenches were in a position to perform.
As challenging as the legitimation question is in assessing lawyering in
the Occupied Territories, answering this question in the context of Taiwan
may be even more difficult. As Jane Winn and Tang-chi Yeh remind us,
Taiwan's legal system has borrowed extensively from Western models, but
the role of law in Taiwan, including the role of law in Taiwanese opposition
to injustice, may differ significantly from what we would find in Western
settings. Winn and Yeh observe that "the public perception that law was
administered impartially has not been central to the legitimization of the
[Kuomintang] regime on Taiwan," in part because although "respect for the
exercise of state power through legal institutions has always been an aspect
of Chinese popular culture, the legitimacy of regulatory institutions has not
generally rested on their claim to protect individual rights as it has in some
Western nations" (p. 563). These observations might suggest that neither
law itself nor legal challenges to government injustice would have impor-
tant effects on the legitimacy of the government of Taiwan.
Another possibility, however, is that there are important effects, but
these effects are not the result of law's seeming, or not seeming, to honor
ideals of liberal democracy. Winn and Yeh write: "One key to political legit-
imacy under the imperial order was the figure of the remonstrating official,
who acted from deep moral conviction and great courage, and at great per-
sonal peril, to draw problems to the attention of the emperor" (pp. 597-98).
Perhaps lawyers' efforts in Taiwan, though couched in terms of liberal val-
ues, ultimately reinforce the legitimacy of a vision of government as an in-
teraction between elites. Whether the current Taiwanese government
benefits or suffers from being judged in this light would depend on whether
it properly honored the courage and conviction of its elite opponents; but
not on whether it moved toward greater fidelity to legal models for protec-
tion of individual "rights." Winn and Yeh thus highlight the importance,
and the difficulty, of determining exactly what is legitimizing or delegitimiz-
ing in a given society and what lawyers' work actually means within the
cultural context in which it is carried out.
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So far we have evaluated lawyers' work against injustice primarily in
light of its impact on the regimes whose conduct the lawyers challenge. But
this analysis, as multilayered as it is, leaves out one factor we must now add
to the balance: the implications of this work for the next regime. As too
many dreary historical examples show, the next regime may turn out to be
worse than the unjust government it replaced. Moreover, the path by which
a country arrives at that next regime may dramatically influence the nature
of the new government. On this score, two of the articles in the Symposium
argue that the impact of lawyers' work now may reinforce the power of the
rule of law in the future. Bisharat sees such an effect in evidence in the
Occupied Territories, where human rights lawyers who have long spoken
out against Israeli conduct now are criticizing the acts of the Palestinian
Authority. Similarly, I find evidence of this effect in the tremendous reli-
ance on law and legal institutions in the new South African constitution.
We deal here in great uncertainties. The sheer existence of legitima-
tion has been contested; the legitimation effects of lawyering against injus-
tice are very complex; the concrete benefits of this work are not always easy
to measure either; and the impact on the next regime is necessarily unknow-
able until that regime arrives. The studies in this Symposium, by taking the
possibility of "involuntary legitimation"' seriously, demonstrate how difficult
it is to firmly demonstrate or refute the significance of this risk. Yet these
studies also illustrate the ability and willingness of lawyers to deploy the
tools of their trade on terrain that might have seemed impossibly hostile.
We need to learn much more about this work, but I believe we already have
reason to conclude that often it is well worth undertaking. Certainly we
know enough to greatly admire many courageous men and women who have
tried to realize the value of law by using it against injustice.
